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THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES REGARDING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD
BANK, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ICSID
AND MIGA
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata*
Introduction
The World Bank (the Bank), is often simply regarded as an interna-
tional institution that provides loans for productive purposes in its
member countries. The Bank's mandate, however, is not limited to
making loans. Indeed, the Bank's founders thought that direct lending
would be a secondary function of the institution.' Early plans for the
Bank show that it was expected that the principle function of the insti-
tution would be "to encourage international investment by private in-
vestors."2 The Bank's Articles of Agreement reflect this expectation.3
Article One of the Articles of Agreement emphasizes the Bank's role in
"facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes'" and de-
scribes the promotion of private foreign investment as one of the Bank's
chief objectives. 5
In the forty years since its inception, the Bank has pursued this ob-
jective in a variety of ways. In acting as a financial intermediary be-
tween its borrowers and foreign capital markets, and as a provider of
funds which mainly finance imports from foreign suppliers, the Bank
can be seen as carrying out its mandate to encourage international in-
vestment. Through cofinancing and the exercise of its guarantee power,
the Bank also stimulates increased international investment by com-
* Vice President and General Counsel, World Bank; Secretary General, Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Pursuant to Mr. Shihata's re-
quest, this article is published as submitted.
1. E. MASON & R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRErrON WOODS 18 (1973)
(hereinafter cited as E. MASON & R. ASHER).
2. U.S. TREASURY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT 4 (1944), quoted in E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra at 18.
3. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Sta. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2
U.N.T.S. 134.
4. Id. at art. I(i); see id. at art. I (iii) (stating "[The purposes of the Bank are to]
promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of
equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the
development of the productive resources of members.").
5. Id. at art. I(ii).
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mercial banks in particular.' The provision of advice and other techni-
cal assistance, either in conjunction with its financing operations or sep-
arately, is a further means by which the Bank has been able to help its
members to attract foreign investment.' One of the Bank's most visible
and interesting actions has been its sponsorship of the establishment of
three other international organizations designed to promote investment.
The first such organization was the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), whose Articles of Agreement were approved in 1955.' Unlike the
Bank, IFC exclusively encourages private sector investment, both do-
mestic and foreign, and makes equity investments as well as loans.'
The two other organizations, which will be examined later, are the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or
the Centre)10 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA or the Agency) 1 whose constituent instruments were approved
in 1965 and 1985 respectively.
It is in the context of this broad objective of the Bank that this Arti-
cle describes the Bank's role in the settlement of investment disputes.
Although its Articles of Agreement do not specifically mention the
Bank's power to undertake this type of activity, the settlement of in-
vestment disputes is clearly a way to improve investment conditions and
thus to stimulate increased flows of international investment.
I. The Bank's Direct Involvement in the Settlement of Investment
Disputes
As a financial intermediary between its capital-importing and capi-
tal-exporting members, the Bank has an institutional interest in pro-
moting the settlement of investment disputes. An unresolved investment
dispute involving one of its borrowing countries can jeopardize the eco-
nomic interests of the borrower which the Bank is intended to serve,
and eventually might affect the Bank's own access to capital markets.
6. See WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 5-9 (1983) (describing the Bank's cofinancing
activities).
7. See WORLD BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1986) (providing an overview of
the Bank's recent technical assistance activities).
8. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, opened for sig-
nature May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
9. Id. at arts. I, 11(2).
10. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter cited as the ICSID Convention).
11. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598, ICSID REv.-FOR. INV. L.J. 147
(1986) (hereinafter cited as the MIGA Convention).
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The settlement of investment disputes in a smooth and orderly manner
can assist the Bank in its borrowing and, therefore, in its lending
operations.
On a number of occasions, the Bank has taken an active role in the
settlement of disputes between member governments of the Bank (or
subdivisions or agencies of members) and foreign investors.12 During
1951-1952, for example, the Bank attempted to provide a basis for the
settlement of the dispute over the nationalization by Iran of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company's assets.1 s Following Egypt's nationalization of
the Suez Canal Company in 1956, the Bank successfully mediated the
settlement of claims by the Company's shareholders against the Egyp-
tian Government.1 4 More recently, in 1985, the Bank agreed to provide
technical advice to help the Argentine state gas company and a Dutch
company settle their differences.
The President of the Bank, in his personal capacity, has also been
willing to assist in the settlement of investment disputes. In 1958, the
City of Tokyo and certain holders of bonds issued by that city entered
into a Conciliation Agreement which requested the President of the
Bank to propose a plan to settle the parties' long-standing dispute. Pur-
suant to this request, the President delivered a plan to the parties in
1960 which led to a resolution of the controversy.' In 1959, the Presi-
dent of the Bank assisted in the settlement of claims arising from the
nationalization and sequestration of British assets after the military in-
tervention in Egypt in 1956.18 In 1965, the President of the Bank also
agreed to act as a conciliator between the parties with regard to certain
private claims resulting from Tunisia's nationalization of electric power
properties in the'late 1950s. Finally, in 1968 the President lent his good
offices to the amicable settlement of disputes arising from the nationali-
12. The Bank has also lent its good offices to the settlement of economic disputes
between the Bank's member governments. A notable example is the Bank's mediation
of the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding the utilization of the water of the
Indus River system. The Bank's efforts led to the conclusion of the Indus Water
Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960. India-Pakistan, 419 U.N.T.S. 126. See Fischer, La Banque
Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Development et lutilisation des eaux du
Bassin de l'ndus, 6 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 667 (1960). In
another type of intervention, the Bank in 1977 assisted the Partner States of the East
African Community in appointing a mediator to settle their differences. WORLD BANK,
1978 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1978).
13. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 1, at 595-610.
14. Id. at 641.
15. WORLD BANK, 1959-1960 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1960).
16. WORLD BANK, 1957-1958 THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1958); E. MASON
& R. ASHER, supra note 1, at 641. The settlement included payment by Egypt of a
lump sum compensation for nationalized property and receipt by it of a fee for ad-
ministering sequestered properties.
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zation of certain foreign mining interests by Zaire.17
When the President of the Bank intervened, it was either as a media-
tor or as a conciliator who submits a report including specific proposals
for a settlement. He was not prepared to act as an arbitrator who ren-
ders a binding decision on the merits of the dispute. In the relatively
few cases where the Bank intervened as an institution, it acted neither
as an arbitrator nor as a conciliator. Instead, the Bank provided good
offices or advice to assist the parties reach agreement on a practical and
effective solution to the problems involved. Resort to the Bank or its
President to assist the parties settle investment disputes proved to be a
cost-effective and highly efficient means of settling investment disputes.
In comparison to the typically high costs of international arbitration,
the expenses involved for the parties were minimal. Through this proce-
dure, parties benefited from the vast experience available at the Bank
and the diversity of its staff to reach a satisfactory settlement in a rela-
tively short time.
II. The Role of ICSID in the Settlement of Investment Disputes
A. BACKGROUND
In spite of the obvious attractions of a wider involvement by the
Bank or its President in the settlement of investment disputes, practical
constraints as well as the limits of the Bank's mandate as a develop-
ment finance institution argued against such involvement. In addition,
there was the difficulty that a country might hesitate to seek the Bank's
involvement if it were not certain of the validity of the country's posi-
tion, and feared the effect that non-compliance with the Bank's advice
would have on its overall relationship with the Bank. Thus, the Presi-
dent of the Bank, while noting the past successes in facilitating the
settlement of investment disputes, observed in 1961 that the Bank was
not really equipped to perform this type of function in the course of its
regular routine. 18 At the same time, a special forum for the conciliation
or arbitration of these disputes could make a contribution to encourage
greater flows of capital to developing countries. The fact, however, that
governments and private investors had turned to the Bank to provide
this assistance indicated that there was a lack of any other specific ma-
17. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 1969 Joint Annual Meet-
ings of the World Bank (including IDA and IFC) and International Monetary Fund
(Sept. 29-Oct. 3, 1969), SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 67 (1969).
18. Address of the World Bank President Eugene R. Black, 1961 Joint Annual
Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Sept. 17-22, 1961),
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 7 (1969).
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chinery for conciliation and arbitration which was regarded as ade-
quate by investors and governments alike. The President of the Bank,
therefore, announced that he would examine the possibility of establish-
ing machinery of this kind.19
Extensive preparatory work and consultations on this possibilty fol-
lowed. By 1964, the prospects for negotiating a convention establishing
the dispute settlement facility appeared favorable. Accordingly, the
Bank's Board of Governors directed the Bank's Executive Directors to
formulate such a convention and submit it to governments together
with such recommendations as the Executive Directors might deem ap-
propriate.20 Pursuant to this directive, the Executive Directors, assisted
by a committee of experts comprising representatives from sixty-one
governments, formulated the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the IC-
SID Convention) and submitted it to member governments of the Bank
in March of 1965 "for consideration with a view to signature and ratifi-
cation, acceptance or approval." 211 The ICSID Convention's entry into
force on October 14, 1966, following ratification by twenty countries,22
established ICSID as an autonomous international organization whose
purpose is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of invest-
ment disputes in accordance with the provisions of the ICSID Conven-
tion.23 Under the Convention, the President of the Bank is ex officio the
Chairman of ICSID's governing body, the Administrative Council,
which, unless a Contracting State makes a contrary designation, con-
sists of members of the Bank's Board of Governors serving ex officio as
members of the Administrative Council.2 In practice, ICSID's ties
with the Bank are much closer than a reading of the ICSID Conven-
tion might suggest. The Vice President and General Counsel of the
Bank has consistently been elected Secretary-General of ICSID and
the Bank meets the total cost of the ICSID Secretariat. 25
19. Id.
20. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Report].
21. Id.
22. ICSID Convention, supra note 10, at art. 68(2).
23. Id. at art. 5.
24. Id.
25. Res. No. AC(17)/RES/55 of ICSID's Administrative Council (on the election
of the Secretary-General) and Report and Financial Statements of the Centre for the
years ended June 30, 1984 and 1983, reprinted in ICSID, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 20-
23.
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B. BALANCE OF INTERESTS OF THE ICSID SYSTEM
In formulating the ICSID Convention, the Executive Directors of the
Bank devised a system that carefully balances the interests of investors
and host countries. The arrangements made for ICSID's Administra-
tive Council reflect this balance of interests. There is one representative
of each Contracting State on the Council, and, as each representative
casts one vote,26 the ICSID Convention assures equal representation for
all Contracting States.
The ICSID Convention gives private investors direct access to an in-
ternational forum. Moreover, provisions of the ICSID rules, which will
be examined in greater detail below, assure investors that refusal or
abstentation by the State party to the dispute to participate in the pro-
ceedings after it has consented to ICSID arbitration cannot frustrate
the ICSID arbitral process.
Against the advantages for investors, the ICSID Convention provides
that a Contracting State may, as a condition of its consent to ICSID
arbitration, require prior exhaustion of local remedies.27 This condition
may be stipulated in the investment agreement, in a bilateral treaty
between the host country and the investor's country, or in a declaration
made by a Contracting State at the time of signature or ratification of
the ICSID Convention, although only one Contracting State, Israel,
has made such a declaration. 8 In addition, Article 42(1) of the ICSID
Convention expressly provides that, unless the parties have specifically
agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal must decide a dispute in accor-
dance with the law of the host State, along with such rules of interna-
tional law as may be applicable. Finally, it was recognized at the time
that the ICSID Convention was finalized that:
When a host State consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor to the
Centre, thereby giving the investor direct access to an international jurisdiction,
the investor should not be in a position to ask his State to espouse his case and
that State should not be permitted to do so."
This consideration finds its expression in Article 27 of the ICSID Con-
vention. That provision expressly precludes the investor's State from
exercising diplomatic protection or instituting an international claim
unless the host State fails to comply with the award rendered in the
26. ICSID Convention, supra note 10, at art. 7(2).
27. Id. at art. 26.
28. Measures Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention: No-
tification Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered Unsuitable for Submission to the
Centre, ICSID/8-C 1 (June 1984).
29. Report, supra note 20, at para. 33.
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dispute. The ICSID Convention's suspension of the right of diplomatic
protection is one way in which the ICSID system contributes to the
depoliticization of investment disputes. The depoliticization of such dis-
putes, which is meant to promote an atmosphere of mutual confidence
between States and foreign investors favorable to increasing the flow of
resources to developing countries is a fundamental objective of the IC-
SID system.80 The main features of this system include its voluntary
character, its flexibility, and its effectiveness.
C. ICSID's VOLUNTARY CHARACTER
ICSID's facilities are available on a voluntary basis. States eligible
to join ICSID (members of the Bank and States invited to sign the
ICSID Convention under its Article 67) are obviously free to decline to
do so. Their decision has no bearing on their relations with the Bank
itself. Even the act of ratification of the ICSID Convention is only an
expression of a Contracting State's willingness, in principle, to make
use of the ICSID machinery. Ratification does not constitute an obliga-
tion to use that machinery. That obligation can arise only after the
Contracting State concerned has specifically agreed to submit to IC-
SID arbitration.
Under Article 25(4) any Contracting State may in addition notify
ICSID, either at the time of ratification or at any time thereafter, of
the class or classes of disputes that it would or would not consider arbi-
trable under ICSID's auspices.3
Within this framework, there is more freedom to determine whether
a transaction is suitable for ICSID arbitration than might be assumed
from the limitation of the Centre's jurisdiction to investment disputes
of a legal character. The ICSID Convention does not define the term
"investment,"32 and this deliberate lack of definition has enabled IC-
SID tribunals to accommodate both traditional types of investment in
the form of capital contributions and new types of investment including
service contracts and transfers of technology. Disputes submitted to the
Centre have ranged from disputes relating to the exploitation of natural
resources to disputes arising out of management contracts and techni-
cal and licensing agreements.3 3 Interestingly, no disputes relating to fi-
30. Id. at para. 9.
31. Thus far, Israel, Jamaica, Guyana, Papua New Guinea, and Saudi Arabia have
made such notifications. The texts of their notifications may be found in Measures
Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-C (1985).
32. ICSID Convention, supra note 10, at art. 25(1).
33. See ICSID Cases. 1972-1984, ICSID/16 (1985) (providing summary informa-
tion on disputes submitted to the ICSID).
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nancial transactions have been submitted to the Centre. Parties are, of
course, also free to decide not to submit their investment disputes to
ICSID, and, although provision for ICSID arbitration is sometimes
made in transnational loans to foreign governments, it is no secret that
lenders often continue to require the judicial adjudication of loan dis-
putes before the domestic courts of New York or London."'
D. FLEXIBILITY OF THE ICSID SYSTEM
The rules applicable to ICSID proceedings are flexible in the sense
that the parties may derogate from them in order to meet their particu-
lar needs. For example, most of the provisions regarding the number of
arbitrators and the method for their appointment are permissive, and
apply only in the absence of agreement between the parties.3 While
they have the necessary flexibilty, the ICSID rules are specific enough
to ensure that a party cannot frustrate the proceedings. Thus, if one of
the parties refuses to cooperate in the appointment of arbitrators, the
tribunal still may be constituted through the appointment of arbitrators
by the President of the Bank in his capacity as Chairman of ICSID's
Administrative Council."6 Even if a party which has consented to IC-
SID arbitration fails to participate in the proceedings, the ICSID Con-
vention ensures that the proceedings can continue and lead to an
award.37 In practice, there has been little occasion for these provisions
to be used, in view of the high degree of State participation in the
proceedings and the frequent termination of these proceedings by
means of amicable settlement.
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICSID SYSTEM
Several factors account for the unique effectiveness of the ICSID
system. While parties are free to decide whether to make use of the
ICSID machinery, the ICSID Convention assures both parties that
once they have consented to submit disputes to ICSID conciliation or
34. Delaume, ICSID and the Banker, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 9 (Oct. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Delaume].
35. The only mandatory provisions are those according to which: (i) an arbitral
tribunal composed of more than a sole arbitrator must include an uneven number of
arbitrators, (ii) arbitrators must possess certain basic qualities, such as integrity and
recognized competence in relevant fields, and (iii) the majority of the arbitrators must
be nationals of a State other than the Contracting State party to the dispute or whose
national is a party to the dispute. The last provision will not apply, however, if the sole
arbitrator or each individual member of the tribunal has been appointed by agreement
of the parties. ICSID Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 14(1), 37(2), 39, 40(2).
36. Id. at art. 38.
37. Id. at art. 45(2).
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arbitration, neither party can unilaterally revoke its consent.3 8 The ex-
clusivity of the ICSID system also contributes to its effectiveness.
Under the ICSID Convention, consent of the parties to ICSID arbitra-
tion is deemed to be exclusive of any other remedy, unless the parties
agree otherwise. 9 This rule has several consequences, one of which is
that ICSID proceedings are insulated in all Contracting States from
any form of judicial intervention or control.
The ICSID Convention furthermore assures the effectiveness of an
ICSID arbitral award once it has been rendered. Article 53(1) of the
Convention provides that such an award is binding on the parties while
Article 54(2) provides that a party may obtain recognition and enforce-
ment of the award by simply furnishing a certified copy to the compe-
tent court or other authority designated for the purpose by each Con-
tracting State.4 It is true that the ICSID Convention does not
derogate from the rules of immunity from execution that may prevail
in a Contracting State,41 and that it is thus possible that an ICSID
award could be executed against the assets of the State (or one of its
subdivisions or agencies) party to the dispute in certain Contracting
States and not in other Contracting States. This issue has not, however,
arisen in practice and is unlikely to arise. Reliance by the State in
question on its immunity from execution would be contrary to its obli-
gation under the ICSID Convention to comply with the award and
would expose that State to various sanctions set forth in the ICSID
Convention. 2 Moreover, refusal by the State involved to comply with
an ICSID award would deprive it of credibility in the international
business community. This is not a risk that a State would be likely to
assume lightly. ICSID arbitration thus offers a degree of finality which,
combined with the relatively low cost of ICSID arbitration, makes it an
attractive alternative to other forms of international arbitration.
Out of twenty-one disputes submitted to ICSID, nine have been ei-
ther discontinued or amicably settled.4 3 This high proportion of settle-
ments is encouraging, but ICSID's effectiveness cannot be assessed
only on the basis of the number of disputes that have been submitted or
settled by that institution. When an ICSID clause provides for arbitra-
38. Id. at art. 25(1).
39. Id. at art. 26.
40. Id. at art. 54(2).
41. Id. at art. 55.
42. See id. at arts. 27, 64 (regarding the resumption of diplomatic protection sus-
pended under the ICSID Convention and the right of the Contracting State whose
national is a party to the dispute to bring an international claim against the non-com-
plying state).
43. ICSID Cases, 1972-1984, ICSID/16 (1985).
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tion, it may be assumed that the prospect of involvement in such pro-
ceedings will work as a deterrent to the actions which give rise to the
institution of proceedings. ICSID thus contributes to conflict avoidance
as well as to settlement of conflicts if they arise.
These features of the ICSID system have not only contributed to the
willingness of parties to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration
under the ICSID Convention but have also helped to foster confidence
in parties seeking the Centre's specialized services in cases falling
outside the framework of the ICSID Convention. In particular, officials
of the Centre, and especially its Secretary-General, have in an increas-
ing number of cases been requested by parties to act as the appointing
authority of arbitrators or concilatiors in disputes which, for one reason
or another, are not suitable for arbitration or conciliation within the
context of the ICSID Convention. 4 To a large degree, this latter type
of ICSID intervention has replaced ad hoc recourse to the Bank or its
President, and in several instances was adopted by parties who had ini-
tially sought the Bank's intervention.45
III. The Role of MIGA in the Settlement of Investment Disputes
A. BACKGROUND
At about the same time that ICSID's establishment was proposed in
the early 1960's, various other schemes were being examined in inter-
national fora to encourage greater investment flows to developing coun-
tries by reducing the effects that non-commercial risks have on invest-
ment decisions. One possibility considered in the Bank since the late
1940's was the establishment of an international agency which would
44. A notable example of this may be found in several recent guarantee agreements
executed by Brazil, which is not a member of ICSID, in favor of foreign lenders to
Brazilian public entities. Delaume, supra note 35, at 9.
45. As in the case of the Brazilian guarantee agreements mentioned, supra note 44,
cases where the State involved was not a party to the ICSID Convention. It should also
be noted that since 1978, ICSID has offered an "Additional Facility" under which the
Centre can administer conciliation and arbitration proceedings in cases where the dis-
putes fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention, either because one of the parties
is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State or because the dispute
does not directly arise out of an investment. Fact-finding proceedings may also be con-
ducted under the Additional Facility. Conscious of the fact that reference to the Addi-
tional Facility now appears in a number of bilateral investment treaties and national
investment laws, ICSID's Administrative Council, which introduced the facility on a
trial basis, decided in 1984 that the Additional Facility should be continued indefi-
nitely. Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and
Fact-Finding Proceedings, ICSID/11 (1979); 2 NEws FROM ISCID, No. 1, at 6
(1985); Broches, The Additional Facility of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), 4 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 373 (1979).
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provide insurance to investors against non-commercial risks. For a vari-
ety of reasons, however, the early proposals to create such an insurance
facility did not materialize."
Concerned about the prospects for financial flows to developing coun-
tries, in view of the slow growth of official development assistance and
the declining trends in commercial lending,47 the Bank's management
in 1981 revived the proposal to create a globally operating investment
guarantee agency under the Bank's auspices.48 As in the case of the
ICSID Convention, extensive studies and consultations then took place,
and support for the proposed new agency gradually broadened. Starting
in June 1985, the Bank's Executive Directors held twenty sessions of
meetings as. a "Committee of the Whole" under the chairmanship of
the Bank's Vice President and General Counsel in order to discuss a
draft of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency (the MIGA Convention). Assisted by experts from mem-
ber governments and by a drafting team from the Bank's Legal De-
partment, the Committee of the Whole agreed on a text of the MIGA
Convention in September 1985.49 After its formal approval by the
Bank's Executive Directors, the MIGA Convention was submitted to
the Bank's Board of Governors. On October 11, 1985, the Governors
adopted a resolution opening the MIGA Convention for signature by
member governments of the Bank and Switzerland. 0
The MIGA Convention will enter into force upon its ratification by
five capital-exporting and fifteen capital-importing countries, provided
that the total subscriptions of these countries amount to at least one-
third of MIGA's authorized capital, or approximately $360 million. 1
The resolution of the Board of Governors referred to above also di-
rected the President of the Bank to convene a preparatory committee of
the signatory states once the MIGA Convention had been signed by the
minimum number of countries where ratifications were required for the
46. T. MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1976).
47. WORLD BANK, 1985 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT Ch. 9 (1985); OECD, DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION 1984 REVIEW, Table IV-2, 65 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
OECD 1984 Review].
48. Address of Bank President A.W. Clausen, 1981 Joint Annual Meetings of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, SUMIARY PROCEEDINGS 15, 23 (1982).
49. Commentary on the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, Introduction [hereinafter cited as Commentary on the MIGA Con-
vention] I ICSID REv.-FoR. INv. L.J. 195 (1986).
50. Resolution No. 406 of the Board of Governors, adopted Oct. II, 1985, re-
printed in IBRD, IFC & IDA, 1985 ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS: SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 244 (1986).
51. MIGA Convention, supra note 11, at art. 61(a).
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entry into force.02 This committee would prepare the draft by-laws,
rules and regulations required for the initiation of MIGA's operations,
and once the MIGA Convention entered into force, the committee's
drafts would be submitted to MIGA's governing bodies for adoption. 3
By June 18, 1986, the MIGA Convention had been signed by the
number of countries required to convene the preparatory committee; at
a meeting held September 15-19, 1986, in Washington, D.C. the com-
mittee adopted a set of detailed draft by-laws, rules of procedure, fi-
nancial regulations, and operational regulations for the Agency. 4 As of
October 7, 1986, fifty countries 0 had signed the MIGA Convention,
including seven Category One countries and thirty-nine Category Two
countries. The prospect of having an operational MIGA by 1987 is thus
no longer a remote possibility. An examination of MIGA's operational
features, organization and financing will help in understanding its role
in the settlement of investment disputes.
B. OPERATIONAL FEATURES
MIGA's objective will be to encourage the flow of investments for
productive purposes among its member countries, and in particular to
developing member countries.58 To fulfill its objective, MIGA will
guarantee and reinsure eligible investments against losses resulting
from non-commercial risk.57 Such insurance activities, however, only
represent one means of achieving MIGA's objective, and the Agency
will carry out a broad range of promotional activities as well.0 8
Article 11 of the MIGA Convention specifically provides for cover-
age of four broad categories of non-commercial risk, but authorizes the
Agency to cover any other non-commercial risk upon the joint applica-
tion of the investor and the host country, provided the Agency's Board
approves such coverage by special majority decision. The four risks
52. Resolution No. 406, supra note 50, at para. 6.
53. Id.
54. FIFrEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 26.
55. These countries are Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colom-
bia, C6te d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea,
Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, St. Christopher, Nevis,
St. Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Yemen Arab
Republic, Zaire and Zambia.
56. MIGA Convention, supra note 11, at art. 2.
57. Id. at art. 2(a). Articles 11-18 of the MIGA Convention detail MIGA's insur-
ance activities and article 20 elaborates on the reinsurance of both public and private
national and regional entities which cover foreign investment against political risk.
58. Id. at art. 2(b).
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specified in the MIGA Convention are: (a) the transfer risk resulting
from host government restrictions on currency conversion and transfer;
(b) the risk of loss resulting from legislative actions or administrative
actions or omissions of the host government which have the effect of
depriving the foreign investor of his ownership or control of, or substan-
tial benefits, from, his investment; (c) the repudiation or breach of gov-
ernment contracts in cases where the investor has no access to a compe-
tent judicial or arbitral forum, or faces unreasonable delays in such a
forum, or is unable to enforce a judicial or arbitral decision issued in
his favor; and (d) the risk of armed conflict and civil disturbance.59
To be eligible for the Agency's guarantee, investments will have to
be new, medium or long-term, and must be judged by the Agency to be
sound investments which contribute to the development of the host
country. 0 While at the outset MIGA will focus on equity interest and
on other forms of direct investment where the investor's profit depends
on the fortunes of the enterprise concerned, it may later be authorized
to expand coverage to "any other medium or long-term form of invest-
ment." '61 Such other forms of investment may include various types of
industrial cooperation such as management and service contracts, li-
censing and franchising agreements, turn-key contracts as well as ar-
rangements concerning the transfer of technology and know-how where
the investor receives a fixed return. MIGA will be able to service sev-
eral new types of investment, especially among developing member
countries which take non-equity forms and in due course, may also
cover commercial loans which are related to a specific investment to be
otherwise covered by the Agency.62
Investors, to be eligible for the Agency's guarantee, must be nation-
als of a member country or, in the case of juridical persons (corporate
investors), must either be incorporated and have their principal place of
business in a member country, or the majority of their capital must be
owned by nationals of a member or members. 3 Eligible investors in-
clude both public and private sector corporations and even member
governments and joint ventures among them. An innovative feature of
the MIGA Convention should be noted in this context: eligibility may,
under certain conditions, be extended to nationals of the host country if
they transfer the assets to be invested from abroad.' MIGA will there-
59. Id. at art. 1 (a).
60. Id. at art. 12.
61. Id. Commentary on the MIGA Convention, supra note 49, at para. 19.
62. MIGA Convention, supra note 11, at art. 12(b).
63. Id. at art. 13(a).
64. Id. at art. 13(c).
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fore be able to assist member countries in their efforts to reverse capital
flight.
In recognition of host governments' sovereign control over the admis-
sion of foreign investment into their territories and the treatment of
such investment, Article 15 of the MIGA Convention provides that the
Agency "shall not conclude any contract of guarantee before the host
government has approved the issuance of the guarantee by the Agency
against the risks designated for cover." The approval must hence ex-
tend both to MIGA's involvement, i.e., the issuance of a guarantee, and
to the scope of MIGA's involvement, i.e., the risks designated for cover.
A member government may, if it wishes, limit its use of MIGA's ser-
vices to the coverage of investments by its nationals in foreign member
countries without necessarily allowing it to cover foreign investments in
its own territory. In short MIGA's facilities, like those of ICSID, will
only be made available where there is consent by all concerned.
MIGA's promotional activities will include carrying out research on
investment opportunities in developing countries, and providing techni-
cal advice and assistance requested by members to improve investment
conditions in their territories.6 5 Article 23(c) of the MIGA Convention
provides that in its promotional efforts, MIGA "shall give particular
attention . . . to the importance of increasing the flow of investments
among developing member countries." MIGA's promotional activities
will constitute a vital part of its mandate and should not be considered
a secondary function of the Agency.
C. ORGANIZATION
MIGA will have full juridical personality and, like other financial
institutions, will have a Council of Governors composed of one repre-
sentative of each member (and his alternate), a Board of Directors
elected by the Council, and a chief executive officer selected by the
Board and responsible for the ordinary business of the Agency."0 The
President of the Bank will be ex officio chairman of the Agency's
Board of Directors.6 7
Membership in MIGA will be open to all members of the World
Bank and to Switzerland on a voluntary basis.6 " As in the case of IC-
SID, every country will be free to join without any effect on its position
in the Bank or any other organization.The distribution of voting rights
65. Id. at art. 23(a).
66. Id. at arts. 30, 31(b), 33, 41(a).
67. Id. at art. 32(b).
68. Id. at art. 4(a).
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in MIGA presents a further innovation which highlights the balance of
interests maintained by the MIGA Convention.
The management of the Bank had originally proposed that voting
power would be shared on an equal basis between home countries and
host countries as groups, with countries initially classifying themselves
as members of one of the two groups, subject to approval of the
Agency's Council.69 During the discussions among the Bank's Execu-
tive Directors, this proposal was challenged on the grounds that it can-
not be foretold how many countries of either group will join MIGA
from the outset and that in view of the unpredictable relative size of
each of the two groups it is inequitable to allocate equal voting power
to them before knowing the actual membership structure. The basic
tenet of the management's proposal, however, was generally accepted,
namely that both groups should receive equal voting power when all
members of the Bank become members of MIGA.70 In the first three
years of its operations, the minority group will be guaranteed forty per-
cent of the total votes, through supplementary votes if required, and all
decisions will be taken in this period by the special majority of two-
thirds of the total votes representing not less than fifty-five percent of
subscriptions in the Agency's capital.71 The supplementary votes and
the special majority requirement will be cancelled at the end of the
three-year period; MIGA's Council will then review the voting struc-
ture with a view to reallocating shares to assure voting parity between
both groups of countries once they subscribe in the reallocated shares. 2
69. The principle of equal representation of groups of countries which have distinct
interests in the activities of the institution is reflected in most international commodity
agreements. For example, the International Coffee, Cocoa, and Jute Agreements 647
U.N.T.S. 3, 882 U.N.T.S. 67, TD/JUTE/ll/ Rev.1 (1983) distinguishes between
member countries which are primarily exporters of the commodity concerned and those
which are primarily importers; each group is allotted 1,000 votes which are then di-
vided among the members of the group in various ways.
Under the system of weighted voting which prevails in most international lending
institutions, voting rights are tied to capital subscriptions (one vote per share) while
each member also receives an equal amount of membership votes. The Articles of
Agreement of the Bank, supra note 3, at art. V(3) (a), for instance, accord to each
member country 250 basic votes as well as one additional vote per share held in the
Bank's capital stock, each share being worth $100,000. But cf., Agreement Establish-
ing the International Fund for Agricultural Development, June 13, 1976, 28 U.S.T.
8435, 15 LL.M. 922 (1976) (members are divided into 3 groups, each having one third
of the total votes).
70. Id. at art. 39.
71. Id. at arts. 3(d), 39(b), 39(d).
72. Id. at art. 39(b).
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D. FINANCING
MIGA is expected to meet its liabilities from premium income and
other revenues such as return on its investments. Accordingly, Article
25 of the MIGA Convention directs the Agency to carry out its activi-
ties in accordance with sound business and prudent financial manage-
ment practices. Under Article 26 of the MIGA Convention, MIGA will
be able to vary its premiums in accordance with the actual risks as-
sumed under its guarantees, but such variations are expected to be
based on the specifics of the investment and risks involved - and
would not simply reflect a political judgment regarding the host
country.
The principle of self-sustenance, though borne out by the experience
of public and private national entities providing political risk insur-
ance7 3 will be supported by arrangements to ensure the Agency's viabil-
ity even when losses exceed reserves at a given moment. These arrange-
ments include a combination of capital subscriptions and
"sponsorship."
The Agency will initially have an authorized share capital equivalent
to $1.082 billion.7 4 The shares will be subscribed by member countries'
in accordance with their relative economic strength as measured in the
allocation of shares in the Bank's capital. Only ten percent of the sub-
scriptions will be paid in cash. An additional ten percent will be paid in
the form of non-negotiable, non-interest-bearing promissory notes to be
encashed only if needed by MIGA to meet its financial obligations.7
The rest of the subscribed capital will be subject to call.7 6 While devel-
oped member countries will make all payments in freely usable curren-
cies, developing member countries will be able to make up to twenty-
five percent of the paid-in cash portion of their subscriptions in their
own currencies." The amount of guarantees which MIGA may issue
on the strength of its capital resources will initially not exceed one and
one-half times the amount of the subscribed capital plus reserves plus a
portion of MIGA's reinsurance coverage (a 1.5:1 ratio).78 Once MIGA
accumulates a balanced risk portfolio and gains experience, it might
73. Bank staff have calculated that as of December 31, 1984 the ratio of net pay-
ments of claims to aggregate premiums of all national investment guarantee programs
was approximately twelve percent.
74. Id. at art. 5(a).
75. Id. at art. 7(i).
76. Id. at 7(ii).
77. Id. at art. 8(a).
78. Id. at art. 22(a).
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increase this ratio up to a maximum of 5:1. 71
In addition to the guarantee operations based on the Agency's capi-
tal and reserves, MIGA will be able to underwrite investments spon-
sored by member countries acting in fact as administrator of a separate
sponsorship account.80 Revenues from sponsorship operations will be
accumulated in a "Sponsorship Trust Fund" which will be kept apart
from the Agency's own accounts.' Claims and other expenses resulting
from sponsorship operations will be paid out of this fund."2 Upon its
depletion, remaining liabilities will be shared by sponsoring countries
only, each in the proportion which the guarantees sponsored by it bear
to the total guarantees sponsored by all sponsoring countries. 3 This
"sponsorship window" represents a particularly interesting feature of
MIGA, not only because it has no financial ceiling, but also because it
allows coverage of investments in all countries, not just in MIGA's de-
veloping member countries, and regardless of the nationality of the
investor."
The combination of capital subscription and sponsorship is another
factor which distinguishes MIGA from the international investment in-
surance schemes previously discussed in the Bank. These schemes re-
lied chiefly on sponsorship by investors' home countries (with some sug-
gesting an initial contribution from the Bank). 5 Adoption of this
concept, however, would have made the Agency dependent to a great
extent on one group of members. By contrast, MIGA will primarily
rely on capital subscriptions from all member countries and will have
the necessary independence to carry out its development mandate in
the common interest of all its members.
E. MIGA AND THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DIsPUTES
Directed to operate on a financially viable basis, MIGA, after it pays
a claim, would assume the rights that the indemnified investor acquired
against the host country as a result of the event giving rise to his
claim. 6 The MIGA Convention envisages that, unless the Agency
agrees otherwise, MIGA would ultimately have recourse to interna-
79. Id.
80. Id. at art. 24; Annex I, arts. 1, 2(c).
81. Id. at Annex I, art. 2(a).
82. Id. at Annex 1, art. 2(b).
83. Id. at Annex I, art. 1(b).
84. Id. at Annex I, art. 6.
85. 1972 Draft Articles of Agreement, International Investment Insurance Agency,
reprinted in T. MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1976).
86. Id. at art. 18(a).
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tional arbitration to enforce such subrogated rights.8 7
Where a conflict arises, however, MIGA's involvement, like that of
ICSID, will facilitate an amicable settlement. If an investor files a
claim, MIGA will have to assess this claim and possibly defend itself
against it. In so doing, MIGA will find itself in a position similar to
that of a host government when confronted with the investor's de-
mands. In many cases, however, MIGA will be in a better position to
assess the investor's claim. MIGA's assessment, based on the broad in-
formation available to it and its worldwide experience, is likely to mod-
erate the conflicting claims of the investor and his host country and
increase the likelihood of a settlement.
Another way in which MIGA may induce host governments and in-
vestors to arrive at amicable settlements is the alleviation of the finan-
cial burden of such settlements on the governments. For example,
MIGA might accept the local currency of the host country on a tempo-
rary basis and pay the investor out of its own funds in freely usable
currency. MIGA might then, under an agreement with the host coun-
try, sell the local currency to the Bank or other international institu-
tions, to companies importing goods from the host country, or to the
host government itself over a period of time and recover its position
accordingly. 88 MIGA might also finance the settlement by paying the
investor in cash and accepting debt instruments from the government
as recoupment. As a variant of this approach, MIGA could persuade
the investor to accept installments rather than insisting on a cash pay-
ment by backing the government's commitments with its guarantee. Fi-
nally, where the views of the investor and the host government with
respect to an adequate compensation cannot be completely reconciled,
MIGA might pay all or part of the difference and in this way facilitate
a settlement. In view of its developmental mandate and institutional
interests, MIGA can be expected to use its potential for the facilitation
of amicable settlements at least as actively as some of the national
agencies, especially the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), have succesfully done.89 In fact, the MIGA Convention specif-
ically directs MIGA to encourage the amicable settlement of disputes
87. Id. at art. 57(b).
88. Id. at art. 18(c).
89. According to unpublished figures obtained from OPIC, OPIC has settled claims
in the amount totaling $96 million by paying compensation in cash to the investor
while accepting installments from the host governments, and claims totalling some
$292 million, by persuading investors to accept host government commitments backed
by OPIC guarantees, or by a combination of cash payments and guarantees.
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between investors and host countries,90 as such disputes constitute the
seeds of conflict between MIGA and its capital-importing members.
F. MIGA's CONTRIBUTION TO CONFLICT AVOIDANCE
MIGA's viability and continuity will depend largely on the good
terms it must establish with capital-importing member countries. It will
have every incentive to avoid conflicts with these countries whenever
possible. From the beginning, the MIGA initiative aimed at the crea-
tion of "a synergism of cooperation" between capital-exporting and
capital-importing countries. 91 MIGA'S operations, much as the discus-
sions which led to agreement on the text of its Convention, would be
generally based on the consensus of both groups of countries. As every
conflict with a member country might weaken this consensus, it is to be
readily expected that MIGA will try to avoid conflict. Moreover, the
pressures of MIGA's very business will force it to underwrite risks with
a view to the avoidance of claims.
The origins of an investment conflict can often be traced to the in-
vestment terms and conditions and to the absence of clear and stable
rules applicable to the treatment of foreign investment. If the terms of
the investment turn out to be unfair to either party or if they lack the
flexibility to be smoothly adjusted to changing circumstances, a party,
especially a host government, might later feel tempted to remedy the
arrangement by unilateral action. Also, if a project runs into financial
or technical difficulties, a host government might interfere in order to
protect its interests or those of its nationals. In addition, the absence of
applicable standards or the application of ambiguous rules often lead to
the initiation or aggravation of disputes. MIGA will, therefore, care-
fully screen every investment project to make sure it is economically
sound, and is consistent with the host country's laws and development
objectives and will contribute to the development of the host country.02
It will deny coverage when it finds deficiencies in the investment ar-
rangement. Furthermore, the MIGA mandated to enter into agree-
ments with member countries on the standards applicable to the invest-
ments it guarantees. In fact, MIGA Convention prohibits MIGA from
initiating guarantee operations in a country unless it is satisfied that
fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment are
available.93 A final safeguard against conflicts is the MIGA Conven-
90. MIGA Convention, supra note 11, at art. 23(b)(i).
91. Address of Bank President A.W. Clausen, supra note 49, at 23.
92. MIGA Convention, supra note 11, at art. 12(d).
93. Id.
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tion's requirement of host government approval for both the issuance of
MIGA's investment guarantee and the risks designated for cover. 4
V. Conclusion
On a number of occasions, particularly during its early history, the
Bank or the President of the Bank have assisted parties in the settle-
ment of investment disputes. Though limited in scope, these interven-
tions frequently have yielded positive results. As it became clear that a
special machinery would be needed for the conciliation and arbitration
of such disputes, the Bank sponsored ICSID's establishment. The wide
membership that ICSID has since attracted 5 reflects its value as an
effective and truly neutral forum where disputes are to be settled ac-
cording to objective non-political criteria. As the services ICSID can
offer have become known for their neutrality, effectiveness, and their
relatively low cost, parties have increasingly made use of its facilities,
not only for the resolution of disputes by conciliation or arbitration
under the ICSID Convention, but also as an alternative to seeking the
Bank's assistance in ad hoc dispute resolution. Twenty years after the
approval of the ICSID Convention, the Bank proposed the establish-
ment of MIGA, an agency whose constituent instrument and institu-
tional imperatives demand that it promote the amicable settlement of
investment disputes. Significantly, both ICSID and MIGA are also
meant to contribute to the avoidance of investment disputes. This is in
keeping with the expectation that they will help create a climate of
mutual confidence between States and foreign investors. In so doing,
ICSID and MIGA serve the broad objective that they share with the
Bank, the promotion of investment for development purposes.
94. Id. at art. 15.
95. As of the date of writing, the ICSID Convention had been signed by ninety-five
countries and ratified by eighty-eight of these nations. See List of Contracting States
and Signatories of the Convention, ICSID Doc. ICSID/3 (October 1986).
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